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NATAL, TRE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SEGREGATION 
Shula Marks 
On the 18th October 1913 Dinmulu ka Cetshmo, son of the last Zulu king, died in 
exile on a farm in the Middelburg district of the Transvaal. In response to the 
condolences of the Government conveyed by the local magistrate, Mankulumana, his 
aged adviser, who had shared Dinmululs trials and had voluntarily shared his 
exile, remarked with some justification: 
It is you [meaning the ~overnment] who killed the 
one we have now buried, you killed his father, and 
killed him. We did not invade your country, but 
you invaded ours. I fought for the dead man! S 
father, we were beaten, you took our King away, but 
the Queen sent him back to us, and we were happy. 
The one whom we now mourn did no wrong. There is 
no bone which will not decay. What we now ask is, 
as you have killed the father, to take care of the 
children. (1) 
For the next twenty years Dinmulufs son a.nd heir, Solomon, engaged in a 
prolonged struggle, first to be recognized as chief of the Usuthu, as his fatherfs 
most immediate followers were known, and then to be recognized as the Zulu parmount, 
by the Natal authorities and the Union government. Despite the fact that he gained 
considerable support both at the level of central government and from a coalition 
of interests in Zululand itself, the strong opposition of the Natal administration 
prevented the realization of his demands; after his death and during the minority 
of his potential heirs, his brother Mshiyeni, who had worked for some time in Natal, 
and who was believed to be ltmost anxious to obtain the good opinion of the 
government and most amenable to the control of the Native Comtni~sioner~~ (2), was 
accorded some wider recognition as Social Head of the Zulu Nation and Regent. After 
a drawn-out succession dispute between Solomonfs heirs in the 1940s, his son, 
Cy-prian, was recognized as chief of the Zulu section in 1948 (3);. a couple of years 
later the Nationalist government installed him llwith great acclamation" as paramount, 
in response to their new imperatives. (4) 
Given the importance of members of the Zulu royal family in the 
contemporaq politics of the Republic, and of the role of chiefs in general in the 
various forms of control in 20th century southern Africa, the earlier years of this 
struggle for recognition and the political alliances it generated are not without 
interest. Not only does the story contribute to recent discussion on the origins 
and dynamic of segregationism in South Africa, and perhaps illuminate through its 
namow focus some relatively neglected aspects of this debate; at a wider level 
it would also appear to provide support for Poulantzasfs view that "dominant 
ideology does not simply reflect the conditions of the existence of the dominant 
class ... but rather the concrete relations between the dominant and the dominated 
classes in a social formation". (5) 
In a series of important articles, Martin Legassick first put forward the 
proposition that segregation was a set of policies specifically designed to cope with 
the strains of a society in the thmes of industrialization, an ideology most clearly 
formulated initially during the reconstruction period in South Africa and devised to 
l resolve the problems aroused in the context of the m i n i n g  industry by the increased 
l proletarianiaation of the African work force. (6) More recently, he has shown the 
I role of key thinkers like Howard Pim, C. T. Loram and R. F. Hoernle in refining this 
\ ideology in the inter-war years, and with others has suggested that segregation can 
l best be seen as the llsuperstructural corollary of the articulation of a dominant 
I capitalism mode of production, with the non-capitalist mode of the African 
l rre~erves~~~. (7) Paul Rich has pointed to yet another strand in segregation policies 
I in this century: in an unpublished seminar paper he has related this to what he 
terms '%he agrarian counter-revolution in the Transvaal, as an intrinsic part of a 
./ political response by the white polity in the Transvaal to the challenges from non- 
1 whites in the agrarian sectorn, in the years before the 1913 Lands Act. (8) 1 
Certainly by the end of World War I segregation, in some form or other, had 
become the accepted convention within which solutions or resolutions of class conflict 
l in South Africa were sought. Valuable as these formulations have been, they do open 
l 
! up certain M e r  questions: questions, as Legassick has pointed out, about the 
relative autonoq of the political and ideological levels (9), and,related to that, 
l why it was that the particular ideological form of segregation was seen as the most 
suitable for an industrializing South Africa. Moreover, by focussing on the period 
I after the South African War, as the time when these policies were fomulated for a 
wider South Africa, the earlier origins of the ideology of segregation have to some 
extent been lost sight of. 
It has frequently been remarked that of all the colonies of South Africa 
Natal's policies in the 19th century were closest to 20th century notions of 
segregation. Not only were many of the key ideologues of segregation in this period 
Natal men - M. S. hrans, C. T. Loram, E. H. Brooks in his earlier phase, and 
G. Heaton Nicholls (10) - most of them also explicitly looked back to Sir Theophilua 
Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes and Secretary for Native Affairs in 
Natal between 1845 and 1875, and the policies he devised8 the allocation of reserved 
lands for African tribal occupation; the recognition of customary law; 
administration -through acceptable traditional authorities; the exemption of Christian 
Africans from customary law; and the attempt to prevent permanent African 
urbanization through the institution of a && labour system. (11) It is these 
features of Natalls 19th century policies which led David Welsh to entitle his book 
on the Shepstone era in Natal The Roots of Segmgation. (12) At first sight the 
coincidence of form is puzzling. At a deeper level, however, it is perhaps not so 
strange. It can, after all, be argued that it was in Natal more than in any other of 
the territories of South Africa that in the 19th Century colonists were forced in the 
first instance to come to terms with the strength of the pre-capitalist mode of 
production and utilize it for their own purposes of surplus extraction and control. 
Of course, one must be ca;reful in this kind of analysis to note that, though the 
forms remain the same, the features of Natal policy in the lgth century are used in 
the 20th for very different purposes, and that, whereas in the mid-19th century 
surplus was being extracted from the pre-capitalist mode of production in the fom of 
rent, tribute or tax, now the same ideology is being used to legitimate the 
extraction of surplus directly in the form of labour power. Yet it is no coincidence 
that there are these analogies, for in both cases we are witnessing an attempt to 
articulate two different modes of production in which the capitalist mode is dominant 
and utilizes the suqluses as well as the ideological forms of the pre-capitalist 
mode. (13) 
That Natal should have afforded the most spectacular possibility of doing 
this raises in turn its particular historical circumstances in the mid-19th century: 
on the one hand, the forces of colonization were we,& and had to come to terms with 
existing structures. On the other, the destruction wrought by the Mfecane and the 
very fact that Africans in Natal were already producing tribute for a Zulu state meant 
that in some respects whites were able to utilize the pre-colonial structures for 
their own ends. Moreover, the fact that in Natal, as Henry Slater has shown so 
well, it was the absentee landowners who were the dominant white class memt that 
surplus value was extracted through rent, which could be produced without a major 
restructuring of African society. (14) The resilience of African society and the 
weakness of settler forces, together with the unwillingness of the British Government 
to pay the cost of totally c w i n g  African society, meant that even the sugar 
planters had to rely for labour on indentured Indians. This again reinforced the 
tendency towards conserving African society, while at the same time providing certain 
other kinds of models for labour control which were to be utilized in the context of 
late lgth/early 20th century mining industry. 
In the trekker republics of the north, Boer supremacy was based on the 
outright expropriation of Africans: where this was not possible (as was not 
infrequently the case, for, as A. J. P. Taylor has remarked of Italy in another 
context, Boer "eyes were big but their teeth were poorll), there was no "arti~ulation~~ 
between two modes of production but simply the uneasy CO-existence of separate social 
formations within a single geographical arena. (15) Boer ideology was undoubtedly 
based on notions of racial superiority - but not on principles of segregation. This 
can be seen as late as 1903 in General Botha's evidence (among others) to the Transvaal 
Labour Commission, when he suggests that the solution to the labour shortage in the 
Transvaal would be to "break up the  location^^^ of Basutoland, Swaziland and Zululand 
in order to release directly their land and labour for the white man - a solution which 
was unacceptable to the Milner administration because of the level of coercion and thus 
expense it would involve. (16) In the Cape, too, where the forces of colonialism were 
far stronger and the disintegration of pre-colonial structures were more thorough-going, 
at least on the colonial llfrontiersw, there was little material base for an ideology of 
segregation. There, as S tanley Trapido has pointed out, a liberal, assimilationist 
ideology emerged out of the dominance of the mercantile class, interested in fostering 
a stable and prosperous African peasantry: a peasantry which could be "produced1' only 
by a considerable restructuring of pre-colonial society, thou& the Mfec- and the flight 
into the Cape of the Mfengu and later the 1856 cattle-killing undoubtedly facilitated 
the process. (17) 
None of these, then, could provide ideologies which llcould serve to 
rationalize or reproduce bomgeois social relations11 in the new industrializing context 
of early twentieth century South Africa, with its massive black proletariat. (18) That 
Natal could provide the model was, however, quickly realized by Sir Alfred Milner, High 
Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. As early as November 1897, in a letter 
to Asquith - at that time front-bench member of the Liberal Party - he categorized the 
various colonies and territories of southern Africa in relation to their treatment of 
the black man: 
The best is Natal, for here the black population is so 
enormous, compared with the white, that though they are 
kept in subjection, prudence, apart'from all other 
considerations, would necessitate their not being treated 
too harshly. Besides, the white men are mainly of British 
race. (19) 
Despite the racial interpretation and Milnerrs emphasis on "treatmentn, it 
would appeax that the High Commissioner was quick to realize the utility of Natal 
fonas for his own llmodernizing" policies: the constraints on using force to 
expropriate Africans in order to provide the necessary labour supply for gold mines 
or the land for white farmers were to be features of his reconstruction 
administration, in common with the early days in Natal, and, given the earlier 
expedients, it was clearly simpler to adapt these than to start from scratch. 
I am not, of course, suggesting that segregation can in any way solely be 
seen as a result of Natal's prior experience: this would be absurd reductionism. 
Apart from all else, the ideology comes to be more and more clearly formulated in the 
newly industrializing context of South Africa. Moreover, it is a many faceted policy 
made up of varying components which can be, and are, subtly shifted in response to 
circumstance and to the needs of different interests of the dominant white group in 
South Africa. Indeed, its great strength as an ideology was its very elasticity, its 
ability to serve the needs of very many different interests and to absorb "elements 
stemming from the way of life of classes and fractions other than the dominant class 
or fractionf1. (20) 
1 It is indeed to these latter aspects that I now wish to turn through a 
closer examination of the relationship of the Natal government to the Zulu royal 
family. In Natal, as we have seen, the control of the African population had been 
l premised since the mid-19th century on the rule of chiefs. The conquest of Zululand 
I in 1879, its annexation by Britain in 1887, and its final take-over by Natal in 1897 
I posed problems, however, in the control of the African population. The war of 1879 
was undertaken, in the first instance, largely to destroy the power of the Zulu king 
and thus release the resources and manpower of the tributary state for white 
l exploitation. It was, however, far more difficult to fill the power vacuum left by 
I the removal of the king in Zululand than it had been in Natal earlier in the century. 
I Despite the British victory at Ulundi, in fact the imperial army never totally 
destroyed the Zulu kingdom (21), nor were the Inrperial authorities willing to take on 
the costs of direct administration of the territory. The Zulu king posed far too great 
a threat to be recognized as a &er, and the settlement after the war therefore meant 
finding the most compliant alternatives. The broad details of this need only be 
rehearsed here: the "Kilkenny catsn settlement after the Zulu war; the return of the 
king as simply one of the maqy chiefs of Zulfland in 1883, in an attempt to end the 
civil warn which had erupted in his absence; the trial of Dinulrulu, his son and heir, 
for rebellion in 1887 and his exile to St Helena; the non-recognition of Dinuulu's 
position as Zulu king on his return from exile and the perennial fears which his 
l presence aroused amongst white officials in Natal and Zululand until his second trial 
asld exile in 1908, for alleged complicity in the Bambatha rebellion. (22) 
Thereafter, for the next six years of his life, Dinufmlu remained in exile. 
The Natal government continued its paranoia about the influence of the Zulu kings and 
strenuously opposed any suggestion that he be allowed to return to Zduland; they 
looked with suspicion on the activities of messengers to and fro from his family, and 
it was only the more relaxed attitude of the Union government which left him to live 
out his last on a farm in the Middelburg district of the Transvaal. (23) After 
his death, a decision had to be taken about the position of his son and heir, Solomon. 
Again, the attitude of the Natal government was passionately against any form of 
reco&tion of the special position of the Zulu kings. Indeed, it was only in 1917 
that Solomon was recognized as chief of the Usuthu section of the Zulu, but, again, 
any further hopes he might have had of wider recognition of paramountcy were sternly 
frowned upon by the Natal administration, (24) 
l 
I In 1916 there was one of those flmies of hysteria to which Natal was prone 
l 
when the support which the Zulu kings enjoyed became dfest. As a result of a 
I misunderstanding, Solomon had called a ritual hunt to llcleanse the nationl1 after the 
l 
period of mourning for Dinuzulu had ended. The Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand. I 
1 
was convinced that this was yet another ploy by the Zulu kings to gain recognition from 
I their people. (25) It was only the intervention of the central government which 
prevented the removal of Solomon from Zu lu l and  and a heavy fine in cattle being i imposed, (26) As late as 1920 the Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand was very 
l concerned by the visit of Solomonfs brother David to Cetshwayo's grave - news of which llthundered through the country1'. (27) The Commissioner waxned the keepers of the grave 
agdinst the consequences of "continuing to be a hindrance to the Government and getting 
mixed up in political matters. They had had a lesson during the rebellion and now they 
were deliberately courting trouble again by becoming mixed up with royal 
youngstersf1. (28) 
Nevertheless, by the mid-20s there was a perceptible change in 
attitude. Although this was not to be given full administrative expression until 
later, it is none the less of considerable significance, particularly as it was 
associated with a class-alliance between the Zulu royal family, the Natal African 
petty bourgeoisie and the Zululand planters. 
On the white side, the key figure was George Heaton Nicholls, at that time 
Member of Parliament for Zululand and President of the South African Planters Union 
and its affiliate, the Zululand Planters Union. (29) By far one of the most articulate 
proponents of segregation, and at this time one of the most influential in terms of 
the political power he achieved, George Heaton Nichollsts role in the formulation of 
the policies of segregation has been curiously underestimated, notwithstanding - or 
perhaps because of - the significance he himself attached to it. (30) An important 
member of the Joint Select Committee appointed to take evidence and formulate revised 
policy on Hertzogls 1926 native legislation, Heaton Nicholls, as a member of the 
Native Affairs Commission, was also responsible in 1937 for publishing as an appendix 
to the Native Affairs Commission Official Report a major interpretation of 
segregationist principles. (31) 
In the late 20s and early 30s he set out his ideas in a series of 
revealing private letters and memoranda. He had little doubt what the alternatives 
to seg~egation would be. As he wmte to J. H. van Zutphen in Ma;y 1929, just as 
tension was mounting in Durban over Championls beer hall boycott, which was to lead 
in the following month to the deaths of six Africans and two whites and the injury of 
another 108 Africans: 
We rwt come back to the real essence of native life - 
communalism - a very different thing to c o d s m .  If 
we do not get back to communalism, we will certainly 
arrive very soon at communism ... We cannot long 
continue as a white aristocracy or black proletariat ... 
We end ultimately I think in the not too distant future 
in the class war. (32) 
He elaborated this further in an undated fra,gment, probably written about 1931: 
An adaptionist policy demands as its primary concept 
the maintenance of chieftaindom, without which the 
tribal society cannot exist. The institution is the 
necessary pivot around which all tribal evolution must 
take place ... The adaptionist policy assumes a 
difference between the Abantu and the Europeans. It 
asswnes what is in effect the growth of a national 
consciousness amongst the Abantu themselves ... The 
opposite policy of assimilation substitutes class for 
race, and if continued on its present basis must lead to 
the evolution of a native proletariat, inspired by the 
usual antagonisms of class war. The process of 
assimilation has already gone very far and unless some 
effort is made to stem the tide of tribal disintegration, 
it will soon be too late. (33) 
He was very concerned with what he saw as the discrepancy between the treatment the 
Government handed out to the ICU organizers, at that time active in Natal, and the 
lack of respect accorded to traditional authority. In the same fragment he 
continued: It. the Governordenera1 on a visit to Durban a few years ago shook hands 
with Champion in the sight of thousands of Zulus assembled . . . by the municipal 
authorities, while Solomon ka Dinuulu was a few later talked down to and 
reprimanded before his people in Zululand by the Governor-General, and his Chiefls 
stipend stopped for a year because of some assumed disrespect.If (34) In yet another 
letter at around the same time, he set out his views, if anything, even more 
explicitly: 
The policy of a Bantu nation, as distinct from that of 
a black proletariat - and that stripped of all verbiage, 
that is the real issue in Africa - obviously brings in 
its train a pride of race. The most race-proud man I 
how is Solomon. He glories in his race and its past 
prowess; and there is no native in the Union who is so 
earnestly desirous of maintaining a Bantu race 
purity ... The fact is that while Macmillan is all 
economics Hoernle omits economics altogether. 
Economics can't be left out - even on the issue of 
miscegenation. Do these people understand the real 
gunpowder mine we are sitting on in South Africa? 
Do they realise that if the white mob once got out 
of hand there would be the red ruin. When the police 
were tell [sic] in Durban to put down the native 
disturbances on Cartmight flats [~ecember 19301 the 
chief constable gave instructions that it was not the 
natives they were to look out for so much, but the 
European mob ... We must take note of the dangers of 
creating a native proletariat . . . (35) 
Heaton Nicholls, as an outsider, was well aware of the possibilities which were being 
shut down by the Government's refusal to acknowledge the position of Solomon: he had, 
in kis Northern Rhodesian days, had the task of training the Barotseland Native 
Constabulary and was doubtless aware of the role, as paramount, played there for the 
BSA Company by Lewanika, king of the Lozi. (36) According to Nicholls, in Zululand 
e 
many of the magistrates had the Zulu war plus the 
Bambatha rebellion mentality and resented the 
influence of Solomon, the Zulu king, in their 
district, altho* they all hew that he was the 
undoubted paramount chief of the Zulus. The 
Government made no use of Solomon on some idea as out 
of date as an assagai that it was dangerous to create 
officially a paramount chief. Solomon himself was 
disgruntled. He asked merely to be used. When 
deadlock was reached between the Administration and 
the natives at Mtunzini in connection with their 
cattle, the administration called Solomon in to help 
them. 'Is that alll, said Solomon ... He went himself 
and settled the dispute in five minutes which had been 
going on for over a year. (37) 
If one prong of Heaton Nicholls~s policy was to restore 13a,ntu-race pride" 
and make use of the unemployed talents of the Zulu royal family, the other was the 
co-option of the Natal African petty bourgeoisie, under the leadership of John Dube. 
This was very clear, both in the schemes he laid before the Joint Select Committee 
and in his correspondence with Dube on the Hertzog legislation. Again, unlike his 
predecessors earlier in the century, who saw John Dube as a lfpronounced Ethiopian" 
who ought to be watched (38), an attitude which persisted until well after World War I, l l 
when the Durban municipal authorities were convinced that Dube was behind the unrest 
amongst workers in that city in 1918-9 and should be reprimanded (39), Heaton Nicholls i 
perceived the conciliatory and conservative role which Dube could plq. In this, 
indeed, he may have been preceded by the CNC for Natal and Zululand, C. A. Wheelwriat, 
who was described in 1923 as DubeIs llstrongest supporterff. (40) 
Again, too, the perceptible shift in attitude comes in the early Itwenties as 
new and more dangerous class forces begin to emerge. 
What Heaton Nicholls recognized was the need to co-opt the Natal kholwa if 
his schemes for the Hertzog legislation were to have any chance of success. His 
connection with John Dube may well have come through their common contact with the Zulu 
king and their common antagonism to the ICU - though I have no direct evidence of this 
as yet. In 1931, through John Dube, he sought and obtained the agreement of a number 
of prominent African leaders to a scheme entitled "The Land Settlementf1, which set out 
!!the principle of creating reservesWin which Natives will be "enabled to attain a high 
standard of economic production under a system of local self-governmentti. The reserves 
were to be compact and large eno- for Africans "to develop a real national life ... a 
becoming race-consciousnessf1. Each reserve was to have, in addition, a local council 
with powers greater than those of the Transkeian Bhunga, the civil service was to be 
open to lfcompetent nativesf1 and the Vullest facilities for trading by Natives in the 
reserves should be allowedf1. There was to be a Union Native Council elected from 
members of the provincial councils to "deal with all matters affecting the native 
people as a whole". In return for the disappearance of the Cape franchise with the 
present voters, there were to be eight Africans elected on equal terms with the 
Europeans to the Senate. (41) 
In his autobiography, Nicholls was thus able to assert with some confidence 
that Natal's effort to find a solution to Hertzogls legislation Ifmet with the full 
approval of a number of the leading nativesf1. (42) It was indeed the success of 
Nicholls's manoeuvres which led to Albert Luthuli's first lesson in politics, 
which he entered when invited to attend a Conference of chiefs and leaders to discuss l 
the Hertzog bills in 1935. The Regent was the Chairman, with Dube acting for him. 
According to Luthuli, the Rev. Mtimkulu, one of the "old guard", was appointed to head 
a committee to report on the findings of the conference, but Luthuli acted in his 
place. When it came to report, however, Mtimkulu rejected the committee's findings - 
and presented instead one which Luthuli describes as "inspired unofficially by a clerk 
in the NAP. It was more than likely that it was inspired by Heaton Nicholls. I 
The upshot was that Natal Africans appeared completely 
indifferent to the fate of their disenfranchised 
brothers in the Cape and the conference appeared to 
accept without criticism the proposals relating to 
land ... We younger men were shocked and taken aback, 
but we did not see how to make an issue of it with a 
politically entrenched older man. (43) 
I do not wish here to dwell on this rather later aspect of the story. I have set out 
some elements of this in my article,I1The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of 
Natalv1. (44) Here, what is important to show are the inter+connections, both at the 
level of Heaton Nicholls'Spolicy formulations and in terms of the alliance between the 
Natal petty bourgeoisie and the Zulu royal family. 
l 
It is no coincidence that it was in the late 20s that Heaton Nicholls began 
to elaborate his ideas on segregation. It is not simply the accident that he was the 
Natal representative on the Select Committee, or that he later became a member of the 
Native Affairs Commission. In the twenties there were more fundamental reasons why 
the representative of fazming interests in Zululand should take such a particular 
interest in schemes for bolstering the powers of chiefs and resuscitating the reserves.- 
Bor it is clear that it was at this point that Zululand began to show really major 
strains as a result of the expansion of white capitalist farming, class formation I 
within the African population, and overstocking and overgrazing - the latter ecological 
concommitants of the first two factors taken together with the consequences of the 
eradication of East Coast Fever - by about 1920. i 
Althou&,as Jeff Guy has pointed out, proletarianization in Zululand 
probably began with the destruction of the Zulu kingdom in the 1880s (45), this was 
still a very uneven and jagged process. Some of the southern districts were feeling 
stress at the beginning of the century, yet as late as 1925 magistrates in Zululand 
~ ~ d m  the good year Africans had had, and the abundance of cattle and grain after 
the rains. In some areas to the north, indeed, settlers and magistrates maintain that 
the Africans have never been more prosperous. (46) One must be wary of taking these 
reports at their face value. Though there clearly were individuals with herds of two 
to four hundred in Zululand at this time, they w e s  undoubtedly the privileged few. (47) 
For the majority, the effects of poverty are only too evident. 
Above all, these were the years in which white farming activities expanded 
rapidly in response to world demand for tropical commodities: cotton and sugar 
expanded along the coast, wattle and sheep in the thornveld of the Zululand interior 
and the northern districts of Natal. And both forms of expansion had major repercussions 
for the African peasant. In the old Republican districts - annexed to Natal after the 
South African -,with their relations of production (if such they can be termed) 
virtually intact - of Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersberg, rural relationships were now 
radically restructured for the first time. (48) The result was massive evictions (49). 
Chief Mgizo, grandson of the Zulu king Npande, put it vividly when he talked of "the 
yawning crack which empties forth human beingst1. (50) Many of these t%omkless 
wandererst1 (51) found their way to Zululand where chiefs tried to squeeze them onto 
already overcrowded lands - lands which had seen a steady influx of Africans from 
Natal not only since the passage of the 1913 Lands Act, but even earlier, since the 
1880s, as part of the British lqsettlementn of southern Zululand. 
The effects in the coastal areas were different but no less traumatic. 
These areas had always been thinly populated - with good reason. As the cotton and 
sugas plantations extended, and the railway was built to service them, a malaria 
epidemic of major proportions raged. (52) It was not to be brought under control 
until the 1930s. No wonder, then, that in the 1930s Msur: Gluclrman found that the 
whites "were accused of having introduced malaria into a Zulu arcadytt .(53) According 
to the Medical Officer of Health in Natal, who was greatly concerned at the casual 
attitude of the Department of Railways to the loss of life in building the new line, 
and the spread of the disease into Natal and even the eastern Cape by non-immune 
labour, 
there is no other part of the union with such a large 
labour force engaged in the conduct of extensive 
agricultural operations in such an unhealthy area. (54) 
It is against this background that the response of the Zulu to the spread 
of the ICU in rural areas has to be understood. As Peter Wickins has shown, the move 
of ICU headquarters to Johannesburg and Durban in 1926 led to "a proliferation of 
branches in the countrysidet1. Kadalie was able to rely very heavily on Durban 
financially, and this became the bastion of the ICU in 1926. (55) Wickins attempts 
to explain this by saying that it was thm@ the Itefforts of A. W. G. Champion, who 
had a genius for making himself unpleasant to those in authority and for fastening 
upon and exploiting grievances". (56) While the role of Champion was undoubtedly 
important, particularly in Durban itself, far more significant was what was happening 
in the countryside. As the Times noted in October 1927, I1thousands of Zulu are 
joining up. The red ticket of promise is everywheren. (51) And it was among the wage- 
labourers and labour-tenants that ICU propaganda gained most response. The reaction of 
Natal farmers was immediate. At a special Congress in 1927 policy was discussed of 
evicting ICU members from the farms, and it seems as though many farmers were doing 
precisely this. In August, it was resolved to take special measures, if possible in 
the form of a Farmers' Vigilance Association for the protection of farmers "against 
unreasonable actions of trade union organizations and communistic b~bies~~. White 
resentment erupted in violence in Bergville, Greytown, Weenen, Ecanskop and 
Pietermaritzburg. (58) In 1929 and 1930 the rural unrest found its counterpart 
in urban disturbances in Durban. Again it is no coincidence that the Communist Party's 
anti-pass demonstration gained its greatest support in Dccrban itself that year. (59) 
The urban and m a l  disturbances are reflections of a single reality: the increasing 
impoverishment of the African population in the rural areas and their proletarianization. 
If, however, one of the responses of the African population was to join the 
ICU in an attempt to find a solution of their problems in these years, it would seem 
equally clear that for many Africans the Zulu king constituted an alternative answer. 
After all, in the Zulu state the king had represented the unity of the community, its 
father and redistributor. He personified the community and had the role of 
"representing and defining the common interests of all members of the community". (60) 
At the ideological level, he and his ancestors had ensured the integrity and well-being 
of the people on both their natural and supernatural planes. (61) Therefore, in a 
situation of crisis it was perhaps natural, especially at a time when the majority of 
Africans had not accepted the new ideology of the whites and certainly did not see the 
white state as in any way representing their interests, that they should turn again to 
the Zulu royal family. (62) 
It is always difficult to explore mass consciousness, and the perceptions 
held by the masses of the people of the Zulu royal family are far from clear, 
particularly as these perceptions are reported and refracted through hostile colonial 
officials, on the one hand, and throw the literate African elite and the far from 
disinterested royal family itself, on the other. Moreover, it can be azg'ued that the 
very processes which the administration used to manipulate the subordinate chiefs in 
Natal to undermine the Zulu Royal family in fact strengthened the latter's position. 
Whereas the subordinate chief S came to be seen as "the government's '{boys l", the royal 
family could, in some sense, be seen - like the people - to be the victims of the 
colonial administration. (63) The cleavages, which Shepstone had picked up in the 
nineteenth century in Zululand (64), were in the process of being papered over by the 
Natal governmentrs very obduracy in r e m  to the royal family. At a time when the 
subordinate chiefs were becoming increasingly uppopular and their power crumbling, as 
a result of the abuse of power, the Zulu royal family, as lkx Gluclanan has rema-rked, 
"had no power to abuset1. (65) And while this probably overstates the case - for power 
was not simply to be measured in the authority granted by the colonial government - 
ironically the very attempt to strip the royal family of its I1pretensionsl1 increased 
its popularity. In the twenties, when so many of the lesser chiefs were becoming 
impoverished and losing their land base through evictions - from which chiefs on 
private lands were no more immune than their followers - the appeal of "the good old 
dapl1 when the Zulu kings had an abundance of lmd and cattle with wkich to reward 
their followers must have been considerable. 
Nor were Solomon and hid advisers unaware of the importance of sustaining 
their popular appeal through positive action-, the@ it is almost impossible to 
distinguish cause and effect throw the inadequacy of the sources. Thus, soon after 
his return to Zululand, at the time of the notorious llhuntfl (66), Solomon was called 
up before the Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand, who told him "to leave the Zulu 
alonev until the government had decided how to define his status: 
His replies were most characteristic, and his 
demeanour ... although ... extremely courteous left 
not the slightest doubt in my mind that his 
aspirations are to become head of the Zulus. He kept 
repeating '1 do not ask these people to follow me and 
show me any sort of respect; wherever I go, they 
recognise me as the representative of the Zulu House 
and accord me the respect due thereto "solornon then 
asked for the restoration of his ancestral lands] . . . 
I told him to disabuse his mind of any hopes of the 
resurrection of the situation which formerly existed ... 
At present, Solomon is attempting to build up his 
status as a leader of the Zulu people with the 
connivance of Mnyaiza [his cousin, and chief adviser]. (67) 
In the twenties, as we shall see, the evidence that the royal family were 
panipulating traditional foms and popular feeling to secure recognition of the 
llparamountll position of Solomon is clearer; there is, nevertheless, considerable 
evidence of the hold the mona.rchy had in popular consciousness. To some extent this 
can be gauged throw the recurrent rumours long after his death that Dinuzulu was 
still alive and about to bring a fresh army into Zululand, or that he was - very 
threatening for the Natal administration - in alliance with the Germans during World 
War I. (68) The rumours continued until at least 1920. (69) In 1923 the missionary 
Oscroft remarked, after observing a meeting of the newly fomed Zulu National Council, 
Mratha (70), that 
the real object is to unite all black races ... they 
consider that the native is victimised in maqy ways 
and receives unfair and unjust treatment from the 
white man; that this will continue as long as the 
natives axe divided; that the native peoples will 
never be strong until there is unity among them. 
They are casting around for a rallying point - a 
central figure - and that figure would seem to be 
Solomon. (71) 
In the twenties, at a meeting of magistrates, all admitted that the power of 
Solomon in their district was ttextraordinary, and that no chief could act contrary to 
his wishesvf. (72) Most strikingly, in 1930 before the Native Economic Commission, 
Archdeacon Lee of Vryheid maintained: 
I may say that the present very serious political 
condition of Zululand - one which cannot be exaggerated - 
I do not want to be alaxdst - may lead to trouble before 
many years are over. The political conditions are due to 
one thing ... and it is ... that while Solomon is 
recognised by the people as their King, he is not 
recognised by the State. He has all the responsibilities 
of kingship and none of the authority. There is no 
political question which is ever debated amongst the Zulu 
people which is not browt to Solomon, and he has 
instituted ... more with the connivance of the Government 
than its recognition a large committee of Zulu people 
which he calls Inkata ka Zulu. (73) 
The origins and development of Inkatha owed as much to the deliberate 
resuscitation of the Zulu royal family of traditional formas to the spontaneous 
reaction of the Zulu people. Founded in 1922-3, by a gmup of Solomon1s advisers, 
including the redoubtable lhkulumana and Mnyaiza, but also a group of Kholwa, 
inclurn John Dube of Natal (741, Inkatha ya ka Zulu was a deliberate attempt to make 
use of traditional forms in the establishment of a council of chiefs and "important 
menvt in Zululand. It was closely associated with the raising of a Zulu National Fund - 
alleged to have g3,000 banked at Vryheid in 1923, and used to pa~r off the debts of the 
Zulu royal family (which were considerable, and which led to snide magisterial comment) as 
well as "to be used for the benefit of the Zulu nation from time to time". (75) At a 
five hundred-strong meeting of Inkatha in 1924 the matters discussed included the 
building of a national church to be called the "Chaka Zulus Church", "to commemorate 
Chaka, who is looked upon as the founder of the Zulu nation and powertt, the Zulu 
National Fund, the division between the MaYldhlakazi and Usuthu sections - a division 
which went back to Cetshwayols day - and, most significantly, the opposition to the 
introduction of the council system on the Transkei model into Zululand; the meeting 
maintained that "the present means of government 3kcough Solomon and the chiefs should 
not be interfered withn. (76) Not surprisingly, Heaton Nicholls was an enthusiastic 
supporter of Inkatha in the late twenties, urging that 
The Inkata is their very own. All the Natives belong to 
it ... It is based upon the old Zulul. [sic] national 
system which existed under their old kings and I think 
it would go far to win the confidence of the Zulu if the 
government would adopt the Inkata instead of creating 
the stereotyped council of the Cape . . . (77) 
As the missionary L. E. Oscroft appreciated, the role of "educated natives 
from outsidev in the creation of Inkatha was considerable. (78) In some respects, 
indeed, Inkatha can be seen - as can this alliance between the Zulu royal family and 
the Natal Kholwa involved in its inception - as a deliberate attempt to reduce the 
tensions which had arisen within Zulu society as a result of the growth of internal 
social stratification. 
For if the general picture in these years is one of impoverishment, as I 
have already suggested (79), it is also evident that the same processes had brought 
into being a class of prosperous black farmers employing outside labour: a process 
which had be* in Natal in the mid-nineteenth century but which found its parallel 
in Zululand in the 1920s. Thus at a time when there is increasing evidence that in 
certain axeas of Zululand congestion, overstocking and erosion, with the consequent 
impoverishment of the people, is the norm, there is also evidence of a stratum of 
increasingly wealthy farmers: according to Archdeacon Lee before the 1930-2 Native 
Economic Commission, "there are people now in Zululand who have herds of three hundred 
and four hundred". (80) More revealingly, he added: "One of the obstacles in the way 
of the more economic use of land is through the land-grabbing by men of importance in 
the community". (81) Many of these were dependent on the use of outside labour, and 
offered the same terms as white farmers. (82) By the second half of the twenties, 
they were also threatened by the rise of the ICU. This indeed was recognized by 
Solomon in a bitter attack on the union in August 1927. Reported in Ilanga lase Natal 
in Zulu, the editor took the opportunity of the Ehglish translation to make the 
message even more explicit: 
. . . the organisation would be a good thing in 
industrial centres if the ideal aimed at was the 
amelioration of conditions under which the natives 
labour, and to secure those means by cooperation of 
both Natives and Europeans. But he [solornon] 
regards the activities of the leaders ... as very 
dangerous ... The I.C.U. are exploiting poor Native 
workers ... The leaders are irresponsible, they do I 
not understand the relations of capital to labour, 
the need for investment ... what workers are they . 
looking for in the native areas and reserves? Are 
any of their leaders engaged in business employing 1 
a number of people for faming and paying 8 shillings I 
a day to their workers? How about that for the men 
of Groutville, Amanzimtoti and Ifafa! Are they l 
prepared to pay their employees that wage? How long 
can they raise cane at a pmfit if they pay such 
(83) 
It is indeed to this alliance between the Zulu royal family and the Natal 
petty bourgeoisie that we must now turn. At first sight, it would indeed appear to 
need some explanation. After all, in the 19th century it was the Natal Kholwa who were 
recruited to fi&t against the Zulu during the 1879 war. During the Bambatha rebellion 
the Kholwa were regarded as Amambuka - traitors to the white man. (84) It was 
frequently held that they had a very different set of values, and were antagonistic 
to traditional authorities. In some cases, in the 19th century, they deliberately cut 
themselves off from their fellow-Africans in their adoption of a new ideology and a 
new way of life - and, indeed, the whole policy of mission reBerves in Natal was 
designed to do precisely this. (85) Nevertheless, nothirg is more incorrect than to 
imagine that there was an inevitable and invariable rift between the new elite of 
teachers, preachers, clerks, lawyers and prosperous farmers and the old elite of 
chiefs. As has now frequently been pointed out, on many occasions the new elite were 
indeed the old in new guise, the sons of chiefs and the aristocracy having had 
preferential access to the resources necessary for the acquisition of education and 
modern skills. John Dube was the descendant of a chiefly family, as was the equally 
distinguished S. M. Molema; Pixley ka, Isaka Seme was marrried to the daughter of 
Dinwulu, and both Stephen Mini and Martin Luthuli, leaders of the Natal Congress at 
the beginning of the 20th century, were Christian chiefs. Both, too, had served as 
clerks and interpreters to the royal families of South Africa: Mini to the Swazi 
royal family, Luthuli to Dinuzulu, both in the 1880s and during his exile on 
St Helena. (89) 
The royal families, moreover, offered not only opportpnities of 
employment but also financial resources to the new petty bourgeoisie. The South 
African Native National Congress was heavily dependent on financial support from the 
major royal families - the Swazi royal family funded its newspaper, Abantu-Batho, for , 
example (88), while S. T. Plaatje hoped that his book, Native Life in South Africa, 
would be financed by a grant from the Rolong chief, Lekoko. (89) With the foundation 
of the South African Native National Congress, the alliance took on an even more 
concrete form: the special role of chiefs was recognized in the creation of a 
separate upper house, while many of the royals were recognized as honorary vice- 
presidents. Dinwulu himself was clearly in close touch with the founders of the 
W C .  (90) 
It was indeed during ~Fnuzulu~s second trial that the support of the Kholwa 
community, expressed through its most outstanding member in Natal at that time, John 
Dube, became most explicit, and it is in their connection during the trial that the 
l 
1 
origins of the later alliance between Dube and the Zulu royal family should probably be 
sought. Both Dube and Seme were heavily involved in the affairs of the Zulu royals 
in Middelburg in the Transvaal, and after Dinuzulucs death Dube continued as adviser 
to the young princes and especially to Solomon, his heir - a fact which caused some 
alarm to the Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, who remarked on ~oloinonls accession 
"that he was one who may confidently be expected to lead a quiet life unless led away 
by the headmen and agitators such as John Dube, Seme and othersn. (91) 
To some extent the royal family could pla~r a function for the new petty 
bourgeoisie which the subordinate chiefs could not: a nationalist role - in the sense 
of a pan-Zulu nationalism; a modernizing role - the position could be conceived of, 
and was, as similar in some way to that of the British constitutional monarchs; while 
their central position as the "pivot of Zulu cultural life" (92) could tie in later on 
very fru5tfully with a revival of Zulu national consciousness. This was most explicit 
in the foundation of the 1930s of the Zulu Society, ostensibly a cultural union for the 
promotion of Zulu cultural identity. (93) It is no coincidence that John Dube was its 
founder and first president, and Mshiyeni its honorary patron. 
I Above all, it can be argued that with the sharpening of class conflict in 
Natal and Zululand in the twenties, the Zulu royal family and the traditionalism it 
represented constituted a bulwark against radical change, a bulwark for the African 
petty bourgeoisie as for the ideologues of segregation. There are several ironies in 
the situation. Whereas in the 1880s it can be argued that it was the "new menr1, 
llentrepreneursll ike Sibhebhu of the Mandhlakazi or the kingts cousin, Uhamu, or the 
intrusive Hlubi in Nqutu district, who were at the same time most closely involved in 
I the colonial econoqr and the king's bitterest enemies, by the twenties and thirties 
l the unrecognized king was coming to act as their spokesman. Even the deep-seated 
rivalry with the Mandhlakazi was resolved on Mankulumanacs death, when the Zulu royal 
l family petitioned the government for Bhokwe, the son of Sibhebhu, to join Matole Buthelezi, son of Tshanibezwe, son of Mny-, CetshwayoIs last hereditary prime 
I 
minister, as joint adviser to Solomon. (94) 
l 
I The Natal kholwa attitude, too, had undergone equally profound changes. As 
late as 1912 John Dube could write in his IIAddress to the Chiefs and Gentlemen of the 
South African Native National Congress": 
Upward! into the higher places of civilization and 
Christianity - not backwasd into the slump of 
darkness, nor downward into the abyss of antiquated 
tribal systems. (95) 
l 
This was a far cry indeed from the views of the kholwa who gave evidence to the 1930 I Native Economic Commission on behalf of the chiefs and headmen in the northern districts 
I of mat& that "everything in tribal custom was good, except the practice of 
witchcraft" (96), and the appeals of Charles Mpanza, secretary of the Zulu Society, in . 
1938 that the paramountcy of the Zulu chief be recognized: 
l 
It was unanimously felt at that meeting [of the Zulu 
Society in Durban] that according to the customs and 
traditions, the preservation of our wholesome 
Traditions and Customs and Rule of Etiquette ... 
should centre around and receive the support of the 
Head of the Principal family of the Zulu whose status 
today was that of an ordinary chief officially. (97) 
From the white point of view, the turn about was even more complete. Whereas 
in the 1870s and 1880s, the Zulu royal family had to be destroyed if Zululand was to be 
"opened upt1 for white exploitation, now that the real powers of the Zulu kings had been 
removed, their regiments dismantled and their economic position undermined, the residual 
hold they had at an ideological level was to be used to make Zululand safe for the sugar 
planters! To quote Heaton Nicholls once more in his advocacy of the recognition of 
Solomon as parmount: 
The recreation and the maintenance of the old native 
aristocracy is essential to the growth of the 
adaptionist ideal ... if native policy could be 
directed to capturing the latent loyalties of the 
Zulu race by recognising the Royal House as paramount, 
it would go far to satisfy native opinion and to 
reorient that opinion in the direction of building up 
a native society in the reserves ... 
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